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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintifl7AppeIlee,

:
Priority No. 2

v.

:

DEANO R. ALIRES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960259-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for attempted possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(2)(aXi) (1991). The Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Was defendant's arrest for driving on a suspended license supported
by probable cause?
Because defendant failed to specifically and particularly raise this claim
below, and does not argue any exception to the preservation requirement on appeal, this
claim is not subject to review under any standard. State v. Johnson, 17A P.2d 1141,1144-

1

45 (Utah 1989) (requiring "some form of specific preservation of claims of error [below]
before an appellate court will review such :laim on appeal"); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d
1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (where appellant does not argue that "exceptional
circumstances" or "plain error" justifies review of an unpreserved issue, the reviewing
court will decline to consider it on appeal).
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the warrantless search of
the passenger compartment of defendant's car was justified as incident to his arrest
for driving on a suspended license?
A trial court's findings in support of its determination to deny a motion to
suppress evidence are reviewed under the "deferential clearly-erroneous standard." State
v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). A
trial courts supporting legal conclusions are "reviewed for correctness, with a measure of
discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." Id.
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-40 (Utah 1994)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shallftotbe violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ivX1991), possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1991), driving on suspension, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1991), and driving an
unregistered vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la1303 (1991) (R. 7-10).
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless
vehicle search (R. 44-46).1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied (R.
343-50).2 Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to attempted unlawful
possession of methamphetamine, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1991), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress (R. 178-185).
The trial court sentenced defendant to twelve months in the Salt Lake
County Jail, which term was stayed pending satisfactory completion of two years
probation (R. 189-90).

1

The motion to suppress is reproduced in addendum A.

2

The transcript of the evidentiary hearing is reproduced in addendum B. The
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are reproduced in addendum C.
3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3
Traffic Stop For No Front Plate. At half-past midnight, on 13 October
1994, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Michael Rapich stopped a gray Honda prelude
traveling northbound on State Street for failing to display afrontlicense plate (R. 210-11,
217).4
Driving on a Suspended License. Once the Honda stopped, Trooper
Rapich approached and requested that defendant, who was the driver and sole occupant,
to produce his driver's license and vehicle registration (R. 213). Defendant was unable to
produce the vehicle registration, but did produce his driver's license {Id.). As defendant
handed his license to Trooper Rapich, defendant stated that his license was suspended
{Id.). Upon learning of defendant's suspended license, Trooper Rapich determined to
arrest defendant, although this was not directly communicated to defendant (R. 228).
Suspicion of Unregistered and/or Stolen Vehicle. Trooper Rapich asked
defendant to step out and stand at the back of the Honda, out of traffic, (R. 213), where he
could safely question defendant about the Honda's owner (R. 221). In addition to the
suspended license, Trooper Rapich suspected that the Honda may be unregistered or

3

The State recites the facts in a light supporting the trial court's ruling. See,
e.g., State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182,1186 (Utah 1995).
4

See Utah Code Ann. § 41- la-401(l)(b) (1993) ("The license plate shall be
issued for the particular vehicle registered and may not be removed during the term for
which the license plate is issued or used upon any other vehicle than the registered
vehicle.").

4

stolen (R. 211-12,230). Defendant said that the Honda belonged to afriend(R. 222-23).
Trooper Rapich then asked if defendant had anything illegal in the Honda, and also asked
for defendant's permission to search the Honda (R. 223,225). Initially defendant
acquiesced and gave his permission for the search, but later told Trooper Rapich that he
thought the Honda's owner needed to give the trooper permission to search (R. 225-26).
Methamphetamine and Drug Paraphernalia Found Trooper Rapich was
ultimately unable to determine who owned the Honda and made no attempt to contact the
owner, nor did defendant ask to contact the owner (R. 226,230). Opening the passenger
door of the Honda, Trooper Rapich located a black fanny pack on the rear seat (R. 215).
Inside the fanny pack the trooper found two plastic baggies containing methamphetamine
(Id). In addition to the fanny pack, Trooper Rapich located and searched a cloth gym bag
which contained a set of scales with methamphetamine residue on it and approximately
one hundred baggies, identical to the baggies containing methamphetamine (R. 215).
Arrest for Drug Offenses, Driving on a Suspended License, and Driving
an Unregistered Vehicle. Defendant was formally arrested at this juncture, for
methamphetamine possession (R. 228,231). Additionally, Trooper Rapich called in the
license plate and discovered that the plate was registered to another vehicle (R. 215). A
check of the vehicle identification number (VIN) returned no indication that the vehicle
was stolen (Id). A warrants check on defendant, however, revealed that defendant had an
outstanding warrant for DUI and that his license was suspended for DUI (R. 214). Thus,
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in addition to the drug offenses, Trooper Rapich charged defendant with driving on a
suspended license and driving an unregistered vehicle (R. 11-14,222).
Motion to Suppress Denied. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the
evidence seized during the warrantless search (R. 44-45), see addendum A. Following
an evidentiary hearing, where only Trooper Maycock testified, the trial court denied the
motion (R. 343-49), see addendum C. While the trial court disagreed that defendant had
voluntarily consented to the vehicle search, the trial court upheld the seizure of
contraband as incident to defendant's arrest (Id). The trial court found, in pertinent part:
3. That Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Michael Rapich,
testified that he observed a gray Honda Prelude automobile
traveling northbound on State Street,
4. That he stated the Honda did not display afrontlicense
plate.
5. That Trooper Rapich stopped the Honda because of the
lack of afrontplate.
6. That the defendant was the sole occupant of the Honda.
7. That Trooper Rapich requested that the defendant produce
his driver's license and the Honda's registration.
8. That defendant produced a driver's license which he stated was
suspended because of a D1JI violation.
9. That defendant was unable to produce a vehicle registration.
10. That defendant stated he had borrowed the Honda from
onefriendto help anotherfriendmove.
11. That the Trooper stated he observed that the defendant
6

acted in a nervous manner when questioned about the
Honda's ownership.
12. That at this point Trooper Rapich decided to arrest the
defendant because the latter's license was suspended.
13. That Trooper Rapich did not formally place the defendant
under arrest, either by stating those words or by placing
handcuffs on the defendant.
14. That Trooper Rapich testified the defendant was not free
to go at this point and that he believed defendant knew this,
and that despite the fact that the word "arrest" was not
spoken; defendant was in custody and, as a practical matter,
"arrested."
15. That Trooper Rapich testified that he then asked the
defendant if there were weapons or anything illegal within the
Honda.
16. That the Trooper stated the defendant told him there were
neither weapons nor illegal items in the vehicle.
17. That Trooper Rapich testified he asked defendant if the
latter "minded' if the former "looked in the vehicle."
18. That Rapich testified that the defendant initially stated he
believed Trooper Rapich needed the owner's consent but
eventually gave "consent" to look in the vehicle.
19. That as the Trooper testified his appearance and
demeanor was that of a gentle, soft-spoken person. That the
Trooper was not large or intimidating in appearance or in his
presence.
20. The Court finds the Trooper was credible in suggesting
that a non-coercive, threatening situation existed.
21. That Trooper Rapich testified that he discovered a black
fanny pack and a cloth gym bag on the back seat of the
7

Honda.
22. That the Trooper testified that two small baggies
containing a white powdering substance were located in the
fanny pack.
23. That he testified he also located several photographs in
the fanny pack, and that one depicted the defendant.
24. That the Trooper testified that the cloth gym bag
contained approximately 100 small, empty baggies and a set
of scales which bore a white powdery residue.
25. That when questioned, defendant admitted to the
ownership of the fanny pack and the controlled substance
found within, which he identified as methamphetamine.
26. That at the time of the questioning, Trooper Rapich had
not yet informed defendant of his constitutionalrightsper
Miranda v. Arizona.
27. That Trooper Rapich subsequently determined that the
rear license plate was not registered to the Honda in
defendant's possession.
28. That Trooper Rapich could not determine ownership of
the Honda through the VIN.
29. That based upon the above, the Trooper testified that the
defendant was then formally arrested and transported to the
Salt Lake County Jail.
30. That the Trooper testified that the defendant was detained
for approximately five minutes before he was formally
arrested.
31. The Court finds that the Trooper was credible in his
testimony and Court adopts the referenced testimony as the
facts.

8

(R. 344-48), see addendum C.
Based on these factual findings, the trial court concluded that:
1. The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was supportable,
due to the observed [license plate] problem.
2. The defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable
detention.
3. The defendant did not give clear, unequivocal consent to
the Trooper, allowing a "consent search" of the vehicle,
despite the Trooper's perception.
4. The search of the vehicle cannot, under these facts, be
supported on the "impound exception" to the search warrant
requirement.
5. The statements concerning ownership of the controlled
substance are not admissible, because they were made
pursuant to an in-custody interrogation, while defendant was,
practically speaking, under arrest, and defendant had not been
informed of his "Miranda" rights to remain silent, etc.
6. The search of the vehicle was substantially
contemporaneous with defendant's arrest and probable cause
existed for the arrest independent of the evidence found in the
search.
7. The evidence obtained as a result of the search of the
Honda should not be suppressed, because it was obtained
incident to, and substantially contemporaneous with the arrest
of Mr. Alires.
(R. 348-49), see addendum C.

9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant does not the dispute the validity of the traffic stop based on the
license plate violation, but rather, challenges the scope of the ensuing detention.
Although defendant has couched his claim as a scope of detention issue, when distilled to
its essence, defendant's claim really constitutes a challenge to the basis for his arrest for
driving on a suspended license. This precise claim was not preserved in the trial court
and is therefore waived.
POINT II
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
court's factual finding that the trooper subjectively intended to arrest him upon his
admission that he had been driving on a suspended license. However, the pertinent
Fourth Amendment inquiry is not whether the trooper subjectively intended to arrest
defendant for driving on a suspended license, but whether, objectively, the trooper was
authorized to make the arrest Therefore, even if defendant were to successfully assail the
trial court's factual determination, his sufficiency challenge misses the mark and should
be rejected. Moreover, in State v. Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court definitively held that
an arrest for driving on a suspended license is statutorily authorized and constitutionally
reasonable. Defendant makes no contrary argument.
Defendant's further broad claim, that the search was not justified by the

10

safety and evidence preservation concerns undergirding the search incident to arrest
doctrine, was not argued below and is consequently waived.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED CHALLENGE TO THE
SCOPE OF HIS DETENTION IS IN ESSENCE A
CHALLENGE TO THE BASIS FOR HIS ARREST FOR
DRIVING ON A SUSPENDED LICENSE; THIS CLAIM
WAS NOT PRESERVED BELOW AND IS
THEREFORE WAIVED
In Point I of his brief, defendant to challenges the scope of his detention
following his admission that his driver's license was suspended. Specifically, defendant
complains that his admission constituted only reasonable suspicion for Trooper Rapich to
further investigate the status of his driving privilege. Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. On that
ground, defendant disputes the legitimacy of his further detention while the trooper asked
him if there were any weapons or illegal items inside his vehicle, and also asked for
consent to search.5 Br. of Aplt. at 9. Defendant maintains that the trooper should have
instead immediately run a computer check to verify that his driver's license was
suspended. Id. The trooper's failure to do so, defendant maintains, rendered the scope of
the ensuing detention constitutionally unreasonable. Id.

5

Although the State refers to the Honda defendant was driving as "his
vehicle," Trooper Rapich was never able to determine who actually owned the Honda (R.
230).
11

Although defendant couches his claim as a scope of detention issue, when
distilled to its essence defendant's claim really constitutes a challenge to the basis for his
arrest for driving on a suspended license. Indeed, there is no scope of detention issue in
this case. Trooper Rapich was authorized to request defendant's driver's license. See,
e.g., State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761,763 (Utah 1991) (following a justifiable traffic stop,
an officer may request to see the driver's license and registration, conduct a computer
check and issue a citation). In response, defendant stated that his license was suspended
(R. 345), see addendum C. In light of defendant's admission and his subsequent arrest for
driving on a suspended license, the pertinent inquiry becomes, not whether the trooper
had reasonable suspicion for further investigation, but whether defendant's admission and
the reasonable inferences therefrom constituted probable cause for his arrest. See, e.g.,
State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664,669 (Utah App. 1991) (holding warrantless arrest proper
if "from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his position would be justified in believing
that the suspect had committed the offense" (quoting State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318,
320,495 P.2d 1259,1260 (1972))), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Incident to
a lawful arrest, police are entitled to search the area within the arrestee's immediate
control, including the arrestee's vehicle,, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460-61
(1981) (holding that following a lawful arrest, police may search the passenger
compartment of the arrestee's automobile, and also examine the contents of any
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containers found therein); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1248 (Utah App. 1996)
(same). The trial court upheld the instant search on this basis (R. 349), see addendum C.
Significantly, defendant raised no challenge to the basis for his arrest in the
trial court (R. 44-45 (motion to suppress), R. 237-244 (oral argument)), see addendums A
and B. Because this issue is now raised for the first time on appeal, it is waived. See
State v. Johnson, 11\ P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (requiring "some form of specific
preservation of claims of error" in the trial court "before an appellate court will review
such claim on appeal"). Defendant fails to argue any exception to the preservation
requirement on appeal, therefore, his challenge to the basis for his arrest is not subject to
review under any standard. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)
(stating that where appellant does not argue that "exceptional circumstances" or "plain
error" justifies review of an unpreserved issue, the reviewing Court will decline to
consider it on appeal).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE
WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF METHAMPHETAMINE
AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA FROM DEFENDANT'S
VEHICLE AS INCIDENT TO DEFENDANT'S ARREST
FOR DRIVING ON A SUSPENDED LICENSE
A.

Objective Inquiry

In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court'sfindingthat
Trooper Rapich subjectively intended to arrest him upon learning that his license was
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suspended (R. 345), see addendum C. Defendant's focus on the subjective intent of
Trooper Ripich, see Br. of Aplt. at 14-18, misses the mark. The pertinent Fourth
Amendment inquiry is not whether the trooper subjectively intended to arrest defendant,
but whether objectively, he could have arrested defendant. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196,1206 (Utah 1995) (rejecting "pretext arrest" analysis and holding that "[t]he validity
of an arrest must be analyzed on objective criteria, not an officer's subjective motivations
or suspicions"). See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, (1978) (rejecting subjective
inquiry for Fourth Amendment purposes: u[T]he fact that the officer does not have the
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification
for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify that action."). Consequently, even assuming defendant
successfully assailed the trial court's factual finding, it is simply irrelevant whether
Trooper Rapich subjectively intended to arrest defendant at precisely the same moment he
was objectively entitled to do so.6 Id. In Harmon, the Supreme Court further found that

6

It is defendant's burden, as the appellant, to "marshal all the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, and then show that evidence to be insufficient."
State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724,734 (Utah App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
Here, Trooper Rapich indicated that it was intent to arrest defendant upon learning of his
suspended license (R. 228). The trooper's other additional statements, that defendant was
not free to drive away (R. 214), that he was going to investigate further and found out
why defendant's license was suspended (id.), and that once he found out defendant had an
outstanding warrant, he was going to take defendant to jail (id.), are not inconsistent with
the trial court's finding and thus they fail to demonstrate any clear error therein (R. 345),
see addendum C.
14

an arrest for driving on a suspended license was both statutorily authorized and
constitutionally reasonable. 910P.2d 1199-12(4. Defendant makes no contrary argument
here.
B»

Waiver

As for defendant's claim in Point II (B), that the instant search was not
justified by the safety and evidence preservation rationales underlying the search incident
to arrest doctrine, Br. of Aplt. at 19-21, a search incident to arrest may be conducted
regardless of whether there is probable cause to believe that the arrestee has a weapon or is
about to destroy evidence. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,15 (1977).
More importantly here, however, this issue was not preserved below and is
therefore waived. Indeed, defendant raised no challenge to the basis for his arrest below
(see Point I, supra), nor did challenge the basis for the search incident to his arrest (R. 4445 (motion to suppress), R. 237-244 (oral argument)), see addendums A and B. Because
defendant failed to specifically and particularly raise his challenge to the basis for the
search incident to his arrest below, and does not argue any exception to the preservation
requirement on appeal, this claim is not subject to review under any standard. State v.
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5
(Utah 1995).

15

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress and should affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^fday of September, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have mailed, by first class mail, postage prepaid, two
accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to ROBERT K. HEINEMAN,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84111, this ^ ? T d a v of September, 1997.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

Third JuHi*i«! District

RICHARD P. MAURO (5402)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

NOV 0 8 1995
I

SALT LAKE COUNTY >

•

•

'

-

"

7
/

•

OfOi^C^fk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—-ooooOoooo—
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A
RESULT OF ILLEGAL DETENTION
AND WARRANTLESS SEARCH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 951901698FS
DEANOALIRES,
THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS
Defendant.
—ooooOoooo—
Comes now the defendant, Deano Alires, by and through his attorney of record,
Richard P. Mauro, and moves this Court to suppress all evidence discovered as aresultof the
Utah Highway Patrol's illegal stop and detention of the vehicle Mr. Alires's was driving. The
police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain that vehicle. £& Utah Code Ann. § 77-715; Sandv Citv v. Thorsness. 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). As such any
evidence discovered as a result of that detention should be suppressed. State v. Shoulderblade.
slip op., at 4, case no. 930518 (Utah 10/25/95).
Here any consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop;
therefore, any evidence seized as aresultof the stop must be suppressed. Shoulderblade. slip
op. at 4; State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684,688 (Utah 1990); Sims v. Collection Div. of Utah State
Tax Comm'n. 841 P.2d 6, 9 (Utah 1992).

000044

Furthermore, any consent given was not voluntary. State v, Whittenback. 621 P.2d
103,106 (Utah 1980); State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Contrel. 886
P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1994).
The state bears the burden of showing that the police possessed reasonable
articulable suspicion to support an investigative stop. State v. Case. 884 P.2d at 1275; State v.
Delanev. 869 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah App. 1994). The state also bears the burden of showing that the
warrantless entry was justified by the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Laracco. 794 P.2d 460. Here the police lacked both probable cause, s ^ State v. South. 885
P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994) (probable cause defined as a "fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found"), and exigent circumstances. State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9
(Utah App. 1993)("circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry .
. . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of
relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating
legitimate law enforcement efforts." (quoting United States v. McConnev. 728 F.2d 1195,1199,
(9th Cir.) £SL denied 469 U.S. 824 (1984)).

DATED this

U? day of November, 1994.

-$,)*** Pm^~
Richard P. Mauro
Attorney for defendant

000045

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to Suppress Evidence
Discovered as a Result of Illegal Warrantless Search to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office,
231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this A . day of November, 1994.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; NOVEMBER 27, 1995; A.M. SESSION
THE COURT:
versus Alires.

We're here in the matter of State

We're here in connection with the

defense's motion to suppress statements and evidence
seized.

I've had an opportunity to read the motion and

memoranda that Mr. Mauro has filed, I haven't received
anything from the state, and I'm happy to hear argument.
MR. UPDE6R0VE:

I'm sorry, Your Honor, the

state's motion, Linda Bethy had taken it over on the
15th of November, but I don't know what happened to it.
It was- THE COURT:

You mean there is something

that's been filed?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.

Why don't you hand it to my clerk

and I'll get a copy of it.

It has not been filed.

MR. MAURO:

I don't believe I have that,

THE COURT:

Is this your only copy?

either.

MR. UPDEGROVE:

I can get one off the

computer, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
have it?

How can you argue it if you don't

Mr. Mauro, could you ask my law clerk to step

in so I can maybe get a couple of copies of this?

All

right, well I will obviously have not the benefit of
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looking at it ahead of time, but Z will look at it in a
moment.
Mr. Mauro, do you want to proceed?
MR. MAURO:

Yes, Your Honor.

Judge, there

was another motion also, the motion to suppress the
custodial statement.
THE COURT:

Do you have that?
Z have that.

That's the motion Z

referred to, and then there is the memorandum attached
to that, that Z guess actually there's a second motion.
Z've read it all, Z was thinking it was part of the
same.

But there are two motions, you're correct.

Any

time you're ready.
MR. MAURO:

Z think the burden would be on

the state to show that the search was legal in this
case.

We filed the motion because we're challenging the

legality of the search and the legality of the
statements.
THE COURT:

What I was wondering is if each

of you wanted to make some kind of introductory
statement before calling witnesses.
MR. MAURO:

Ho, Your Honor.

MR. UPDE6R0VE:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

Mr. Updegrove, you have a

witness?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

Yes.
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MR. MAURO:

And we'd move to invoice the

exclusionary rule.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

The State would call Trooper

Rapich.

MICHAEL S. RAPICH
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State,
having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as
follows:
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. UPDEGROVE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. UPDEGROVE:
Q

Please state your name and spell your last

name.
A

Michael S. Rapich, R-A-P-I-C-H.

Q

By whom are you employed, sir?

A

Utah Highway Patrol.

Q

How long have you been with- -

A

Just over three years.
THE COURT:

This is the only witness you

intend to call?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:
Q

Today, yes, Your Honor.

All right, you may proceed.

(BY MR. UPDEGROVE)

Are you a certified peace
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officer in the state of Utah?
A

Yes, I am.

Q

Nov, turning to the 1st of October of 1994,

last year, at about 30 minutes past midnight, were you
on duty?
A

Yes, I was.

Q

And what were you doing, sir?

A

I was working DUI enforcement in the Salt

Lake area on State Street.
Q

In Salt Lake County?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, as X say, approximately 30 minutes past

midnight, did your attention get drawn to a gray Honda
Prelude northbound on State Street?
A

Yes, it did.

Q

For what reason, sir?

A

It didn't have a front plate.

Q

Now, as far as front plates are concerned,

have you had occasion before to stop vehicles for front
plates?
A

Yes, on many occasions.

Q

Why do you do that, sir?

A

It's been my experience as a police officer

that quite often when a vehicle doesn't have a front
plate, the plate on the rear of the vehicle doesn't
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belong to it, either*

A lot of times someone will just

grab one plate off another vehicle and put it on the
rear of the vehicle*
THE COURT:

Do you want to pull up the

microphone, please, and speak up a little bit?
THE WITNESS:

Which was the case on this

occasion.
Q

(BY MR. UPDEGROVE)

Now, are you familiar

with the statute that requires a front license plate?
A

Yes, I am.

Q

And is that the reason you stopped the

vehicle?
A

Yes, it was.

Q

How many people were in the gray Honda

Prelude when you stopped it?
A

Just one.

Q

And is that individual, the driver, present

in court today?
A

Yes, he is.

Q

Would you please point him out and describe

what he's wearing?
A

He's seated right next to the defense

attorney, wearing a purple shirt and a black vest.
THE COURT:

The record will reflect an

identification of the defendant.
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Q

(BY MR

UPDEGROVE)

what did you ask of the

defendant when you stopped him?
A

I asked for his driver's license and

registration.
Q

Did he produce the registration?

A

I don't believe he did.

He did produce a

driver's license.
Q

Did he make any statements spontaneous to you

about his driver's license?
A

Yes, he did.

He advised me that his license

was suspended.
Q

For what reason, sir?

A

I found out later it was for DUX.

I don't

think he told me at the time.
Q

Nov, did he tell you anything initially at

the stop about the nature of the vehicle?
A

Yes, he told me it belonged to a friend of

his, that he'd known since high school, a female friend.
Q

And what was he doing with the vehicle?

A

He'd borrowed the vehicle to help another

friend in a moving situation.
Q

Did you ask him to exit the vehicle?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

And where did you place him?

A

I had him move to the rear of the vehicle out

1

of traffic.

2

Q

3
4

the vehicle, his license was suspended?
A

Well, he wasn't going to drive the vehicle

I any longer.

7
8

What was your

I intent at that point?

5
6

Nov, what was your intent when you found out

I was going to investigate the natter

further and find out why his license was suspended.
1

9

Q

And did you do that?

A

Yes, I did.

10

I

Q

And for what reason, sir?

11

J

A

Why did I find out why

Q

Why was it suspended?

A

It was suspended for DUI.

Q

Did you find out if there were any warrants

12
13

I

14
15

for hin?

16

A

Yes, he did, he had a warrant for DUI.

17

Q

Now, knowing that, was he going to drive off

18

with the vehicle?

19

I

A

No, he wasn't.

20

I

Q

Were you going to arrest hin?

21

I

A

For

22

was going to take hin to Salt Lake County Jail.

23

Q

24

the vehicle?

25

Once I found out he had a warrant, I

I

A

Now, but prior to that, did you ask to search
Yes, I did.
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Q

And did you find anything in the vehicle?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

What did you find, sir?

A

In the- -

Located in a black fanny pack on

the rear seat, I found two plastic baggies containing a
white powdery substance.
Q

Was there anything else on the seat?

A

There was also a cloth gym bag.

Q

And did you search that?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

And what was in that?

A

There was a set of scales and a purple box

which had white powder residue on them, also numerous
baggies identical to the ones that contained the
methamphetamine.

There was approximately a hundred of

those.
Q

Did you run the plate?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Was it registered to the vehicle?

A

No, it was not.

Q

Did you run the VIN number?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Did you find anything on the VIN number?

A

I was unable to find any record of the VIN

number in any of the surrounding states for Utah.
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Q

Did the defendant consent to the search?

A

Yes, he did.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

Thank you, sir.

THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. MAURO:

Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAURO:
Q

Trooper Rapich, did you fill out a report in

this case?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And is that the report that you have in your

hand?
Yes, it is.
MR. MAURO:

May I approach the witness, Your

THE COURT:

You may.

Honor?

Q

(BY MR. MAURO)

You've got what's been

provided to me as an incident report.

Is that your

incident report?
A

I believe so.

It looks like it.

Q

And for the record, that's a typed statement;

is that right?
A

Yes, it is.

Q

And at the top of it, it says "Incident

Report"?
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A

Yes, it does.

Q

On that report you have the date of the

incident is 10-13 of '94; is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

You also have the date of the report,

however, of 7-14 of '94, which would be several months
earlier; is that right?
A

Yes, that's true.

The only thing I could say

for that is, it's typed by a secretary and she must not
have changed that date on the report.

It's a format

that's in her computer and she just uses the same format
for every report.

Obviously she didn't change that date

when she made the report.
Q

So there was a mistake in the report, then;

is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, on this date you said that you are

participating in what you call DUI intervention?
A

That could be termed that way, yes.

Q

is that right?

Now, you saw the gray Prelude

driving down the road; is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

You didn't note any, other than a license

plate, any equipment violations with the- A

Right.
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1

I

Q

There was no weaving?

2

|

A

No.

3

I

Q

No swerving?

4

I

A

No.

5

I

Q

No crossing the line that you observed?

6

I

A

No.

Q

Were you driving toward the vehicle, or were

7
8

I you behind the vehicle when you- -

9

10

A

I was driving towards the vehicle, I was

I southbound.

11

Q

And you observed that it didn't have a front

12

I plate?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And you had some suspicion that the plate on

15

the back may have been plac%d on there, it didn't belong

16

to the car that, the Prelud*; is that right?

17

A

18
19

Well, as a routine matter I stop vehicles

with no front plate, and th% reason I started doing that
I is I found quite commonly that's the case, yes.

20

Q

But prior to the time of doing the stop you

21

I didn't run a license plate on the- -

22

I

23
24
25

A

No, I did not.

Q

And you didn't m

n

a license plate when you

I got out and you. approached ltr. Alires, did you?
A

No, I did not.
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1

I

Q

In fact, you didn't run the license plate

2

I until after you had placed Mf. Alires under arrest; is

3

that right?

4

A

5
6

possession of methamphetamin*; y«s.
I

7
8

After I placed hi* under arrest for

I

9

Q

That was after yoi* had conducted the search?

A

Yes.

Q

So prior to doing the search you hadn't run a

license plate; is that right?

10

A

No.

11

Q

You hadn't run a warrants check?

12

A

No, I had not.

13

Q

And you hadn't had any communication with

14
15

dispatch regarding ownership of the gray Prelude?
I

A

Yes.

16

Q

You pulled the vehicle over with your lights?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

The vehicle pulled over?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Mr. Alires was th# driver?

21

I

A

Yes.

22

I

Q

You approached Mr* Alires and asked him to

23
24
25

step out?
A

After I found out that his driver's license

was suspended, yes, I did*
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Q

Let me ask you some questions about that.

A

Okay.

Q

In your report you detailed the order of

events as they occurred; is that right?
A

I tried to, yes.

Q

And it's an accurate depiction of how the

events in this case occurred; is that right?
A

Okay, yes.

Q

And it was written on, actually over a year

ago; is that right?
A

Yes, it was.

Q

And when we look at it today, a year later,

we can say that this is accurate; is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

And it was written at a time when it was

fresher, or you had a better memory of the events; is
that right?
A

Yes.

Q

You said that Mr. Alires stepped out of the

vehicle, right?
licenmm

Or that you asked him for a driver's

and a registration.

A

Yes, I did.

Q

He produced his driver's license, is what you

A

Uh-huh.

say.
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Q

If you look on your report; is that right?

A

Yes.

Q

He wasn't able to produce the registration?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

Okay.

And he gave you the name; is that

1

right?
A

Gave ae which name?

Q

His name.

A

I think I got it off the driver's license he

produced.

°
A

And that was accurate; is that right?

Q

So then you brought him to the back of his

Yes, Z believe so.

vehicle between your vehicle and his vehicle; is that
right?
A

After he stated that his driver's license was 1

on suspenstion.
Q

1

And you began questioning him about the

license plate?
A

1
1

License plate- -

Questioned him about the

J

ownership of the vehicle initially.
Q

And he told you that a friend owned the

vehicle?
A

Yes.

Q

You didn't write him a citation for no plate,
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did you?
A

I believe I warned him for that.

Q

Did you write him- -

You didn't write him a

citation for suspended driver's license at that point?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

You did?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you have a copy of that with you?

A

Yes, I do.
MR. MAURO:

I'm sorry, Judge, I don't have

THE COURT:

That's all right.

that.

Q

(BY MR. MAURO)

When was that written?

A

That was written on 13 October, 1994.

Q

Was that written before you conducted the

search, or after you conducted the search?
A

After.

Q

So what you did, then, the course of events,

you knew that he had a suspended driver's license?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

But you didn't do a dispatch at that point?

A

Not at that point.

Q

You began questioning him about the car

ownership?
A

Yes.
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Q

And he told you his friend owned the car?

A

He i•aid a female friend, yes.

Q

And at that point you weren't writing a

citation, were you?
A

No, I was not.

Q

At that point you were questioning him, then

1 you began questioning him about other things?
A

Yes •

Q

And you began questioning him about weapons

1

in the vehicle?
A

Yes.»

1

Q

You weren't writing a citation at that point?

A

NO.

Q

How long had he been detained at that point

when you began asking him questions about the weapons?
A

About the weapons?

I don't know, five

1

minutes, maybe.
Q

•

And during that five-minute period of time,

you hadn't written a citation?
A

No.

1
1

He was not free to leave, and he was not 1

going to be until Z determined why his license was
suspendedI
THE COURT:
question, please.
Q

Officer, would you wait for the

Just answer what's asked of you.

(BY MR. MAURO)

1

So for that five-minute
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period of time between the time you stopped him and the
time you began asking him about the weapons, you didn't
1 write any citation out?
A

No, I did not.

Q

You didn't begin writing a citation?

A

No, I didn't.

Q

And you didn't do a dispatch check of any

1 kind in that five-minute period of time?
A

No.

Q

Your questions were directed mostly toward

Mr. Alires, who was standing, facing you, talking to
you; is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

Prior to the time that you began asking him

about weapons, he didn't produce any weapons, did he?
A

No, he did not.

Q

He didn't say that he had any weapons?

A

No.

Q

He didn't show you any weapons?

A

No.

Q

And you didn't see any weapons in the

1

vehicle?
A

No.

Q

You didn't note any bulges on this clothing?

A

Not that Z recall, no.
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Q

Then you began asking him about whether he

had anything illegal in the vehicle.
A

Yes.

Q

Prior to that tine he hadn't said that he had

anything illegal, had he?
A

No.

Q

You hadn't observed anything illegal on his

person?
A

No.

Q

You hadn't observed anything illegal in the

A

No.

Q

After you asked those questions, you then

car?

asked if he "minded if I looked in the vehicle.**

Those

were the words that you wrote in your report; is that
right?
A

I asked him if he minded if I looked in the

vehicle, yes.
Q

And he said, initially, he didn't mind if you

looked in the vehicle; is that right?
A

No, he did not.

Q

You didn't use the word "search the vehicle"

in your report?
A

No, I did not.

Q

And what's written here is accurate; is that
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right?
A

Yes, it is.

Q

Mr. Alires indicated to you that it wasn't

his vehicle.
A

Yes.

Q

And that it would be appropriate for you to

1 contact the owner, or for him to contact the owner.
A

I think is what he said is, he stated, N I

think the owner needs to give you permission to search
1 the vehicle."
Q

Did you make any attempts to call the owner?

A

No, I did not.

Q

Did you have dispatch make any attempts to

call the owner?
A

No, I did not.

1

Q

Did you allow Mr. Alires to call the owner?

1

A

I did not.

Q

As you previously indicated, he was not free

He didn't ask to.

to leave at that point?

1
1

A

No, he was not.

1

Q

You opened the door of the vehicle; is that

1

A

The passenger door, yes.

1

Q

You went inside the vehicle?

1

A

Yes.

right?
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1

I

3

Q

There was a black fanny pack in there.

A

Yes.

3

I

Q

And you opened the fanny pack?

4

1

A

I did.

5

1

Q

By unzipping it?

A

Yes.

Q

And there was another gym bag in there?

A

Yes.

6
7

I

8
9

I

Q

And that was a closed gym bag?

10

I

A

Yes, it was.

11

I

Q

And you opened that bag by unzipping it?

A

Yes.

Q

Are you familiar with the Miranda admonition?

A

Yes, I am.

Q

If I could have you look through your report,

13
13

I

14
15

I

16

I don't see any indication that Mr. Alires was given the

17

I Miranda admonition.

18

I

A

He was not.

19

I

Q

When you opened the black fanny pack you

30

I found an item that you believed was an illegal

31

substance; is that right?

33
33

I

A

Yes.

Q

Let me ask you- -

Let me take a step back.

34

In your mind, Mr. Alires was detained, at the point when

35

you initially stopped him, when you learned that he had
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1

I a suspended driver's license?

2

I

A

Yes, he was.

3

1

Q

He wasn't free to leave at that point?

4 |

A

He was not.

5

Q

And you were going to arrest him?

6

I

A

Yes, I was.

7

I

Q

And you didn't read him Miranda at that time?

A

No, I didn't.

Q

Then you conducted a search of the vehicle;

8
9

I

10

is that right?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And when you conducted the search of the

13

vehicle you discovered some things inside the vehicle.

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And you had a suspicion that they were

16

illegal narcotics?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

You didn't read Mr. Alires the Miranda

19

I admonition at that point?

20
21

I

22

25

No, I did not.

Q

After that point, you asked Mr. Alires some

questions about the ownership of the fanny pack?

23
24

A

I

A

Yes.

Q

And you talked, you asked him who owned the

fanny pack?
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A

Yes, I did.

Q

And that's when Mr. Alires told you- -

A

He said something to the effect that, "I

won't lie to you, it's mine.19
Q

Did you use a consent form at all?

A

No, I did not.

Q

Do you have consent forms available to use?

A

We have, the Highway Patrol has a consent

form.

I didn't use it at this time.

Q

At the time when you conducted the search,

how many officers were present?
A

There was a second officer responded to the

scene, I don't know if I'd started the search yet or
not.

I believe he had already arrived.

I'm not sure.

Q

That was- -

A

Trooper Roberts.

Q

So there were two patrol vehicles there at

some point, anyway?
A

Yes.

Q

There were two patrol vehicles there when you

questioned Mr. Alires about the ownership of the
substance?
A

Yes, there was.
THE COURT:

Just a minute.

on some kind of race track, here.

I feel like we're

And it's hard for me
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to lake in the answers that are coming so fast, I
suspect my court reporter is having a hard time getting
it down.

Please wait until the question is fully asked,

take a breath, then answer.

If we could pick- -

Slow

down the pace a little bit, please, and then we'll maybe
understand what's being said.
Could you repeat the last question, and let
me get the answer again, please?
MR. MAURO:
Q

I've forgotten it now.

(BY MR. MAURO)

There wasn't any evidence

that this vehicle was stolen, was there?
A

No, there wasn't any hard evidence, no.

There was some suspicion in my mind that there's a
possibility of that, but no, there was no solid
evidence.
Q

Did you ever make any attempts to contact the

owner of the vehicle?
A

I never was able to determine who the owner

of the vehicle was.
MR. MAURO:

I don't have any further

THE COURT:

All right, redirect?

questions.

MR. UPDE6R0VE:

Very briefly, Your Honor.
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. UPDEGROVE:
Q

Was that vehicle impounded after Mr. Alires

was arrested?
A

Yes, it was.

Q

Was there a search conducted pursuant to the

impound?
A

An inventory search, yes.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

You may step down.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Thank you, sir.

Thank you.

Thank you for your assistance.

Is there any reason why this officer can't be excused?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
Your Honor.

I would like him to remain,

I have to talk to him a little bit.

THE COURT:

Then that'll be the order.

Any

other witnesses?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

None for the state, Your

Honor.

argument.

MR. MAURO:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

You may proceed with oral

Mr. Updegrove, you have the burden.

want to go forward?

Do you

Let me remind you that I haven't

had any chance to read the memorandum.
MR. UPDEGROVE;

I'm sorry, Your Honor, I have
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no idea vhare it vent.
THE COURT:

Well, occasionally things are

misfiled downstairs, but since Mr. Mauro doesn't have a
copy of it, either, I suspect it just never vent out.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

I will find out about that as

soon as I get back, Your Honor.
Your Honor, first of all, looking at
Mr. Mauro's motion, the stop vas valid.

He claims it is

not, but I believe, under State v. Lopez, the Supreme
Court said that there's no longer the necessity to look
at it from a reasonable officer's standpoint.
THE COURT:

Z can't understand you.

Do you

vant to pull that up and repeat that again, please?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

I'm sorry.

Under State v.

Lopez, the Supreme Court has stated that there's no
necessity to look at a traffic stop from the reasonable
officer's standpoint.

It is clear here that there vas a

violation, there vas no front license plate, and I
believe the Utah Code Annotated 14-1A-404(1).
And on top of that, Trooper Rapich has stated
in his experience he has found that vhen you only have
one license plate, sometimes the vehicle, the license
plate has been stolen, and only one has been taken.
That's vhy there's none on the front.
But regardless of that, there is a violation
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of the Utah Code vhich, under Lopes, the officer vas
certainly, or the trooper vas certainly, his action vas
appropriate in stopping the vehicle.
You also had heard, Your Honor, that
Mr. Alires, who's been identified as the driver, the
only person in the vehicle, stated almost immediately
upon being asked for a driver's license and
registration, he could not produce a registration, and
he stated his license vas suspended.

Then you heard the

trooper say that he intended to arrest him at that
point.
Nov, the trooper then asked consent to search
the vehicle.
the lily.

It's our argument that that's just gilding

When he intended to arrest, he vas going,

since there vas only one person in the vehicle, he vas
going to impound the vehicle, and he vas going to do an
impound search, and a search incident to arrest.
So there's tvo points.

Search incident to

arrest, and an impound search, particularly after he
found out that the vehicle, the license plate on the
rear, did not match the vehicle.

He ran the VZN number

and he could not, as you heard him state, find the
ovner.

So the vehicle vas going to be impounded, and it

vas impounded.
THE COURT:

Don't you have a problem, here,

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

0 00V S 3

Mr. Updegrove, in that he didn't arrest him at that
point in time, before the search was conducted?

He may

have had that in mind, he may have had the basis for the
arrest at that point in time, but he did not effectuate
the arrest until after the search.

Isn't that a

problem?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
problem, Your Honor.

I don't see that as a

Z believe the case lav is that you

don't have to say the magic words.
THE COURT:

But an arrest had not occurred.

It isn't just a question of magic words.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

Well, I believe Trooper

Rapich said he was not free to go, Mr. Alires would not
be free to go, once he had stated that his license was
suspended.
THE COURT:

And so you say that's the same

thing as an arrest?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

Hell, I believe the case law

is once somebody is not free to go, they're in custody.
And that's
THE COURT:
determination.

Well, that's a custodial

That may be useful to look at in the

context of the statements, but I'm now talking about
impound searches subsequent to an arrest.

And what I'm

saying is there did not appear to have been an arrest
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until after the search.
MR. UPDEGROVE:

Granted, Your Honor, the

trooper did not say the magic words, "You're under
arrest."

He asked hia to get out of the vehicle, took

him back to the rear of the vehicle.

And then he asked,

determined that it was a borrowed vehicle, the vehicle
had been borrowed from a friend, it wasn't Mr. Alires#
vehicle.

And then he asked if he could- -

didn't say, "Could I search the vehicle?"

Well, he
"Could I look

in the vehicle?
Mr. Alires did eventually say he could look
in the vehicle.

He found the drugs in the fanny pack,

and the formal arrest flowed from the drugs, from
checking with dispatch that the license plates did not
match the vehicle, and that Mr. Alires had a warrant for
his arrest for failure to appear.
I would submit that Mr. Alires was going to
be arrested.

Once the trooper found all of the

information, eventually Mr. Alires would have been
arrested.

There is no doubt about it, he was not going

to be allowed to go off with the vehicle, and there
would be an impound search.

So it was inevitable that

that fanny pack- THE COURT:
search.

But this wasn't an impound

Isn't that a distinction with a huge
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difference?
MR. UPDEGROVE:

Hell, Your Honor, I would say

that if it's inevitable that that vehicle is going to be
subjected to an impound search, that the drugs would
have been found.
Now, what if Mr. Mauro argues that if he was
not arrested immediately and all of the magic words
said, and the search incident to arrest, since the
vehicle was going to be impounded?

Z don't see the

difference if eventually, once Trooper Rapich discovered
the plates didn't match, the VIN number, he couldn't
determine an owner, and found out, in fact, that the
license was suspended and there was a warrant for his
arrest, Mr. Alires is not going to go free.

He was the

only person in the vehicle, that vehicle was going to be
seized and impounded, and that would have been found.
If the argument is that Trooper Rapich did
not say, at that point that he comes out of the vehicle,
finds the license, Mr. Alires admits that the license is
suspended, he doesn't say, "You're under arrest," then I
find it hard to understand how any impound search could
become valid at some point later on.
Mr. Alires was going to be arrested, and I
don't see how the defense can argue that the state would
not have found that evidence eventually.
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And that's basically the State's argument.
THE COURT:

All right, thank you*

Mr. Mauro?

MR. MAURO:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Judge, I guess vhat my primary concern is, is
one of the questions that you asked.
inventory search.

This isn't an

And Z wasn't prepared- -

THE COURT:

I'm going to find- -

I mean

there's no question about it, and the distinction in
terms of timing is a critical one.

As a matter of law,

the court finds that this was not a search of an
impound-type nature.

It occurred far before the vehicle

was seized, or the car.
But I think we do have a viable question as
to whether or not consent existed.

Why don't we focus

on that.
MR. MAURO:
inventory.

Just one additional point on the

I guess what I'm concerned about, the issue

has been raised, we hadn't been provided any documents
about whether an inventory search had been conducted, we
weren't aware of that.

It's certainly our intent to

challenge any inventory search, and I'm just looking
down the road a ways.
THE COURT:

The bottom line is, it wasn't

found as part of an inventory or impound search.

It was

found before that as part of the basis for what I
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understand to have been the arrest*
MR. MAURO:

Right.

And the first issue

The way I see it, there are three in this case.
one, is there voluntary consent?
versus Loyola talks about.

Number

Which is what State

Number two, was voluntary

consent given at a time when the police had a right to
detain Mr. Alires?

And number three, what was the scope

of that consent?
And I'll address the first one.
consent voluntary?
five-part test.

Was the

Bobo and Whittenbeck set out a

The absence of claim of authority to

search by the officers.

Clearly Mr. Alires is detained.

He's standing on the side of the road.

There's an

authority figure that's asking him to search.

So

clearly there are police there, there's probably another
backup officer there asking them to search.
The question becomes, is he giving voluntary
consent under those circumstances?
he's not.

We would argue that

The absence of an exhibition of force by the

officers, there were no guns drawn, there were no
threatening manners.

However, I would submit that at

12:30 in the evening there is in somewhat of a coercive
nature about it.
THE COURT:

Where's the coercion?

Z mean

that, I think you're going to need to flesh out for me,
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because what I aav on tha witness stand was an officer
who appears to ba fast speaking, but soft spoken,
appears to ba a gentle, professional individual*
Where's the coercion?

There are no coercive statements

that you elicited.
MR. MAURO:

No, and I guess what I'm saying,

Your Honor, is the general nature of a police-citizen
encounter is going to be somewhat coercive, particularly
when the citizen is not free to leave.
THE COURT:

Isn't that, then, Mr. Mauro, that

every time somebody is stopped, it's arguably coercive
if a law enforcement officer is there?
MR. MAURO:

And it's one of the factors that

the court can consider in the totality of the
circumstances.

And I would agree, there isn't a direct

threat, there's no indication of voices being raised,
but Z think in the totality of circumstances the court
should consider that.
The third is a mere request to search.
in this case, Your Honor, it's somewhat unusual.

And
Is

there a mere request to search—and I'll talk about that
when I talk about the scope of the consent—but there is
a consent to search.

Mr. Alires' response is—and

remember, he's not free to leave—"I think we need to
contact the owner.

I think we should get the owner
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involved in the search."
And there's no attempt at all to allow the
owner to come there.

There is, nonetheless, a search

that occurs under the circumstances of the case.

And I

would suggest to the court that this was something more
than a mere request to search.
Cooperation by the owner is the fourth one,
and clearly we didn't have that here.

There was no

attempt to contact the owner.
Absence of deception or trick on the part of
the officer.
Your Honor.

And Z don't know what was going on there,
Z do know that there was a response by

M r . Alires which was an appropriate response.
contact the owner."

"Let's

And then after that, some period of

time, we don't know what time that is, there's a search
that's conducted of the vehicle initiated by the
officer.

Him opening the door and going into the

vehicle.
Do we have the absence of deception or trick
on the part of the officer?

Z don't know.

Z do know

that there were questions and there were responses to
those questions that weren't dealt with, and then
there's a search of the vehicle.

Z don't know what

happened in that interim period of time.
The second question is, under Arroyo, is
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there attenuation?

Was the request to search

sufficiently attenuated?

In other words, and I guess

the simple way of looking at that, did the police, at
the

time they asked to search, have a right to detain

Mr. Alires?
He's detained for a period of five minutes.
There are no citations that are written at that point,
there's no confirmation from dispatch, there's nothing
done to initiate the ticket-writing process.

And after

a five-minute period of time, your inquiry into a
completely different area involving weapons, and maybe
illegal items that may have been placed in the vehicle.
Would Mr. Alires have been free to leave
after he'd been written a ticket?
been.

He may very well have

There are circumstances, I suspect, where he may

have been written a ticket during that five-minute
period of time, and then be allowed to leave.
What would have happened to the vehicle, I
suppose, is speculation.

But the point is, at the point

that they begin asking him for permission to search, a
five-minute period of time, and nothing has been done to
initiate or complete the stop.
And we would suggest that at that period of
time that they have exceeded the scope of their
authority by not doing that, and therefore that's
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another factor for the court to consider in going to
consent, number one.

And number two, the legality of

the consent, or Mr. Alires' legality.
The third, and I think probably the most
important issue, Your Honor, is the scope of the
consent.

And if I can remember the officer's words

correctly, he asked, "Do you mind if I look in the
vehicle?"

There's nothing about searching the vehicle,

nothing about going in the vehicle, nothing about
opening containers within the vehicle.
Z look in the vehicle?"

"Do you mind if

And Mr. Alires' response was,

"No, I don't mind if you look in the vehicle."
There's nothing about opening the door during
that request, or nothing about going to the fanny pack
or the gym bag, or anything else in the vehicle, looking
in the glove box, or conducting a full-blown search.

I

think a citizen would think that to mean, "Sure, go
ahead and look in the vehicle," maybe walking up to the
vehicle and looking inside the vehicle.

The scope of

the consent isn't a full-blown search, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

But, on the other hand,

Mr. Mauro, the defendant is there, and when the officer
goes to look in the fanny pack, he doesn't register any
negative response.

He doesn't say, "Stop, you're not

now just looking in tha vehicle, you're going beyond
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that."

And he's right there*

I Bean he had the

opportunity to object at that point, did he not?
MR- MAURO:

I think he objected prior to that

by saying, "Let's get the owner here*"
some ambiguity.

And so there's

Nov, when the officer, he says, "No,

you can't search, we need to have the owner here," and
then he eays, "No, I don't mind if you look in there,"
at very best there's confusion on Mr. Alires' part.
I mean what's his ability at that point?
he say, "No, don't go in there"?
going to object.

Can

I don't think he's

He's objected once already, the

objection has been rebuffed, there's been nothing done
to contact the owner.
At that point, I mean he's standing there on
the side of the road, the officer goes in and opens the
door.

I suggest that he's not going to object any more

to what the police officer's doing.
Just briefly, Arroyo deals with the scope of
the consent.

And it quotes Professor LaFave on page

691, and it talks about scope of consent, and I've
argued that already.
We would submit it.

We would argue that any

statements made are subject to be suppressed because no
Miranda was given.
THE COURT:

All right, as to the first
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statement, the statement that, "I have a suspended
license,** the motion to suppress, if you're seeking to
suppress that, is denied.

The court finds that that was

spontaneously stated, it was not in response to a
specific inquiry or question, consequently Miranda does
not cover that.
As to the second statement concerning
ownership of the fanny pack, your motion to suppress is
granted.
That leaves us with the bigger question, and
that is the search, itself.

Do you want to speak to

that issue again, M r . Updegrove?
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

Y e s , ma'am.

Just to clarify my prior comment

with reference to the second statement, it was clearly a
statement of an important nature in response to either
an implied or an actual-asked question, and the court
finds that Miranda should have been given before any
additional interrogation or questioning and statements
occurred.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
argue about that.

And the State is not going to

I notice we didn't get into that on

the examination of Trooper Rapich.

He and I have

discussed it, when you're in custodial interrogation and
you are interrogating somebody, you're supposed to give
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I them Miranda.

2

1

3
4

Nov, in response to Mr. Mauro, the factors he
stated concerning the getting, finding the owner.

In

I this case you heard the trooper state that the license

5

plate was registered to another vehicle, and running the

6

VIN number, he could not find an owner.

7

I told an owner that he can remember.

8

I did give permission the second time.

9
10

And he was not

And the defendant
He said, "Yes,

okay, you can look."
Now, Trooper Rapich has also stated that the

11

defendant was not going to leave, he was not free to

12

leave, he was going to be arrested.

13

Now, as to Mr. Mauro's statement on, "Mind if

14

I look in the vehicle?"

Well, let's look at that in the

15

common sense viewpoint.

The trooper had a flashlight,

16

he could look in the vehicle.

17

If you want to take the

I words, "Mind if I look in the vehicle?" the trooper

18

didn't need any permission to shine his flashlight into

19

that vehicle.

20

The trooper could look into the vehicle, it

21

was in plain view.

Truly what the trooper said, and he

22

probably should have said, "Do you mind if I search the

23

I vehicle?" when you say "look into the vehicle," it's

24

not, "Mind if I look in the vehicle and see what's

25

there?" It's, "I'm going to look into the vehicle and
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search it."

And as Your Honor correctly pointed out,

when that started there was no objection from
Mr. Alires.
THE COURT:

Let me just take a minute and

read the state's memorandum in opposition.
All right, with reference to the motion to
suppress, the court finds the following:
The motion is denied.

The court finds that

the initial stop was an appropriate and proper stop.
There was a basis for the stop by virtue of the
statutory violation of the plate statute.
14-1A-404.

That's

That provided the trooper with the basis for

stopping the individual who was behind the wheel, this
defendant.
The detention and the timing of the same
appearing reasonable in view of how the search occurred,
et cetera.

It was not an unduly long time.

Although

it's not clear how long total was involved, it appears
clear that only some five minutes passed before the
indication that additional crimes had occurred became
clear.
The problematic aspect of this, however, has
to do with the consent.

The court finds that there was

not a clear, unequivocal voluntary consent.

The reason

forms are developed by police departments, such as the
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highway patrol, is to obviate, or avoid this problem.
Had a form been used, the defendant would have seen
exactly what was being asked of him, that it was not
just a request to look in a vehicle, but a consent to
search the vehicle, and the contents of the same.
It's questionable whether the defendant would
have then said yes, given his prior responses.

So the

court finds that the basis for the search cannot be
adequately supported by the consent argument.
However, the court finds that it is clear
that at the point in time that the officer asked the
defendant, Mr. Alires, if he could look in the vehicle,
he had already determined that he had enough to arrest
the defendant.

He had indicated it was his intent, or

plan to arrest the defendant at that point in time, and
he had indicated that the defendant was not free to
leave.
And while this is very different from an
arrest, it certainly is incident to an arrest, and that
is, I think, the significant thing, here.

The case law

is quite clear that what one should look for is whether
the search was substantially contemporaneous with the
arrest.

And under these circumstances, given the timing

involved, the totality of fact and circumstance, I
conclude that it was substantially contemporaneous.
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Therefore, the search was not an impound
search, that is clear.

It was not a consent search,

because the consent was equivocal.

But rather, it was a

search predicated upon, well, a search incident to
arrest.
While the search occurred prior to the
arrest, it occurred subsequent to the intent to arrest,
and substantially contemporaneous with the same.

So the

motion, as I indicated, is denied.
There's a lesson to be learned, here,
Officer- -

And the court will further find, before I

get into that, that there is nothing coercive that has
been attested to, and the court has considered carefully
the appearance and demeanor of the police officer.

And,

as I referenced earlier on the record, he is a
soft-spoken, gentle-appearing individual, both in his
demeanor and in his physical presence, et cetera.
And the court cannot find that the mere fact
that he was a police officer engaged in his official
duties, where no weapon by the police officer was ever
exhibited, nor forceful commands were ever made, or
anything else of that type occurred, that this was
coercive, and that is one of the important aspects of
this that the court has considered.

Although typically that goes to the issue of
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consent, and I have determined that the consent in this
case was equivocal, I think it is one of the totality of
circumstances that the court has considered in assessing
the credibility of the witness for the state and the
propriety of the search in general.
As I was going to say before, Officer, one of
the reasons that a form is employed, and would have been
useful in this case, and would have helped with the
equivocal consent issue, is that it clarifies what it is
that the police officer is asking for, specifically what
is going to be searched, et cetera.

And then if the

individual consents, you have his signature.
In this case, as I say, it's not clear
whether the defendant would have signed such a consent
request or not.

But in any event, the court has

determined that the search was incident to arrest.

Is

there anything else we need to discuss at this time?
MR. MAURO:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I'm going to ask, Mr. Updegrove,

that you prepare findings consistent with my ruling, but
not necessarily limited to what I have verbally
articulated, and also an order granting- -

Well, it's

denying the motion to suppress, and granting in part- Let me start again.

Denying the motion to

suppress as to the evidence seized, but granting in part
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the motion to suppress as to statements, particularly
the second statement that had to do with the ownership
of the fanny pack.

And get it to Mr. Mauro for his

review, and then I'll sign it if there are no
objections.
We have a pretrial set for the 22nd of
December, and we have a trial set for January 2nd.

Are

those dates still viable?
MR. MAURO:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

Anything further,

then, that we need to handle today?
MR. MAURO:

The only issue, Your Honor, I can

file a motion, is we're probably going to want to sever
the driving on revocation charge from any drug charge,
particularly if there were prior DUZs on the record.
THE COURT:
stop.

It provides the basis for the

It's going to be difficult for that to be severed

as a practical matter, and legally I have some concerns
about that.

I'll be interested in looking at what you

file and what Mr. Updegrove's response is on that.
see some problems with that.

I

Anything else at this

point?

then.

MR. MAURO:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

We're in recess,

Thank you both for the excellent job you did in
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calling these issues to my attention, and we'll see you
back here on the 22nd.
*

*

*
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Addendum C

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG

7 1997

SALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Cltrk

2H THE DISTRICT COURT Of THB THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IV AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

t FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
t
S CASE NO.

DEANO R. ALIRES,
Defendant.

951901698

t
s

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion to Suppress
Custodial Statements, filed in the above-entitled matter, came on
for hearing before the Court on November 27, 1995, at 9:30 a.m.
Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Richard P. Mauro,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, and the State of Utah was
represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy District Attorney.
Findings submitted by the prosecution were objected to by defense
counsel.

The Court offered defendant's counsel an opportunity to

draft proposed Findings.

After a significant delay, these were

finally submitted in late June, 1997. The Court has now considered
all proposed Findings and enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
In his Motion to Suppress Evidence, the defendant alleged Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Michael Rapich lacked reasonable articulable
suspicion to stop and detain the motor vehicle driven by the
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defendant.

PAGE TWO

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

In his Motion to Suppress Custodial Statements,

defendant alleges that the statements he made, were made while he
was in custody and before he was informed of his constitutional
rights under Miranda v. Arizona,

Argument was made and testimony

was taken from Trooper Rapich at the hearing, and the Court denied
the Motion to Suppress Evidence and granted the Motion to Suppress
the defendants statement.
Being fully advised in the premises, the court makes the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, based upon the
credible testimony adduced.

riwiwqg QF FACT
1.

That defendant was charged by Information in Count I,

with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute;

in

Count

II, with

Unlawful

Possession

of

Drug

Paraphernalia; in Count III, with Driving on Denied, Suspended,
Disqualified, or Revoked License; and in Count IV, defendant was
charged with Driving without Registration or Certificate of Title.
2.

That the Information was based upon certain activities

which took place during the early morning hours of October 13,
1994, at 1700 South State Street, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
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3.

That

testified

that
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Highway

Patrol

Trooper,

he observed

a gray

Honda

Michael

Prelude

Rapich,

automobile

traveling northbound on State Street.
4.

That he stated the Honda did not display a front license

plate,
5.

That Trooper Rapich stopped the Honda because of the lack

of a front license plate.
6.

That the defendant was the sole occupant of the Honda.

7.

That Trooper Rapich requested that the defendant produce

his driver9s license and the Honda1s registration.
8.

That defendant produced a driver license which he stated

was suspended because of a DUI violation.
9.

That

defendant

was

unable

to

produce

a

vehicle

registration.
10.

That defendant stated he had borrowed the Honda from one

friend to help another friend move.
11.

That the Trooper stated he observed that the defendant

acted in a nervous manner when questioned about the Honda's
ownership.
12.

That at this point Trooper Rapich decided to arrest the

defendant because the latter9s license was suspended.
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That Trooper Rapich did not formally place the defendant

under arrest, either by stating those words or by placing handcuffs
on the defendant.
14.

That Trooper Rapich testified the defendant was not free

to go at this point and that he believed defendant knew this, and
that despite the fact that the word "arrest*9 was not spoken;
defendant was in custody and, as a practical matter, "arrested."
15.

That Trooper Rapich testified that he then asked the

defendant if there were weapons or anything illegal within the
Honda.
16*

That the Trooper stated the defendant told him there were

neither weapons nor illegal items in the vehicle.
17.

That Trooper Rapich testified he asked defendant if the

latter "minded11 if the former "looked in the vehicle."
18.
he

That Rapich testified that the defendant initially stated

believed

Trooper

Rapich

needed

the

owner's

consent

but

eventually gave "consent" to look in the vehicle.
19.

That as the Trooper testified his appearance and demeanor

was that of a gentle, soft-spoken person. That the Trooper was not
large or intimidating in appearance or in his presence.
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The Court finds the Trooper was credible in suggesting

that a non-coercive, threatening situation existed.
21.

That Trooper Rapich testified that he discovered a black

fanny pack and a cloth gym bag on the back seat of the Honda.
22.

That

the Trooper testified

that

two

small baggies

containing a white powdery substance were located in the fanny
pack.
23.

That he testified he also located several photographs in

the fanny pack, and that one depicted the defendant.
24.

That the Trooper testified that the cloth gym bag

contained approximately 100 small, empty baggies and a set of
scales which bore a white powdery residue.
25.

That when questioned, defendant admitted to the ownership

of the fanny pack and the controlled substance found within, which
he identified as methamphetamine.
26.

That at the time of the questioning, Trooper Rapich had

not yet informed defendant of his constitutional rights per Miranda

Vt Arizona27.

That Trooper Rapich subsequently determined that the rear

license plate was not registered to the Honda in defendant's
possession.
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That Trooper Rapich could not determine ownership of the

Honda through the VIN.
29.

That based upon the above, the Trooper testified that the

defendant was then formally arrested and transported to the Salt
Lake County Jail*
30.

That the Trooper testified that the defendant was

detained for approximately five minutes before he was formally
arrested.
31.

The Court finds that the Trooper was credible in his

testimony and the Court adopts the referenced testimony as the
facts.

CQECWSIPPg PT fcftW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes,
as a matter of law, that:
1.

The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was supportable,

due to the observed licensure problem*
2.

The defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable

detention•
3*

The defendant did not give clear, unequivocal consent to

the Trooper, allowing a "consent search" of the vehicle, despite
the Trooper's perception.
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The search of the vehicle cannot, under these facts, be

supported

on

the

" impound

exception" to

the

search warrant

requirement*
5.

The statements concerning ownership of the controlled

substance are not admissible, because they were made pursuant to an
in-custody

interrogation,

while

defendant

was,

practically

speaking, under arrest, and defendant had not been informed of his
"Miranda" right* to remain silent, etc.
6.

The

search

of

the

vehicle

was

substantially

contemporaneous with defendant's arrest and probable cause existed
for the arrest independent of the evidence found in the search*
7.

The evidence obtained as a result of the search of the

Honda should not be suppressed, because it was obtained incident
to, and substantially contemporaneous with the arrest of Mr.

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

^fc-::
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